(WASHINGTON) — On Oct. 13, 2023, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Red Stag, a 184-foot offshore supply vessel (OSV), was moored at the Adriatic Marine dock in Port Fourchon, La. The vessel’s crew consisted of a master, relief captain and three crewmembers. The vessel had been in dry dock and had recently moved to the Adriatic Marine dock to prepare for an upcoming work assignment, which was scheduled for the next day.
At approximately 11:30 p.m., the crewmembers conducted watch relief; the oncoming watch consisted of the relief captain, unqualified engineer (UE), and deck hand. As common practice during the watch relief, the offgoing and oncoming personnel conduct a pass down, to include work completed by the previous watch and work to be completed by the oncoming watch.
The offgoing first engineer passed to the unqualified engineer that the vessel was leveled off via the mud pump system. The work assigned to the oncoming watch included cleaning the engine room, cleaning the interior spaces, and preparing for mooring stations. A job safety analysis (JSA) was completed by the unqualified engineer for the engine room cleaning, the deck hand completed a JSA for the interior space task, and both the unqualified engineer and deck hand completed a JSA for the mooring stations task.

Once the watch relief was completed, the crewmembers set off to complete their assigned tasks. At approximately 5:30 a.m. on Oct. 14, 2023, the unqualified engineer asked the deck hand the location of the voltage meter. The deck hand did not know the location of the tool. At approximately 6:40 a.m., the vessel’s master found the unqualified engineer unresponsive on the engine room floor next to the open mud pump high voltage panel.
The master of the vessel immediately notified the crew and emergency medical services (EMS), then the crew started administering first aid. The Port Fourchon Harbor Police and EMS arrived and continued first aid until the unqualified engineer was pronounced deceased at 7:40 a.m.
Through this investigation, the U.S. Coast Guard determined the initiating event was the presumed material failure of the mud pump system. This was followed by the death of unqualified engineer. The causal factors that contributed to this casualty included: (1) failure to follow company policy and procedures, (2) lack of engineering experience, (3) missing visual or audible indicator of emergency stop activation, and (4) missing locking device on high voltage panel.
Click here to read the complete incident report.
– U.S. Coast Guard