On Oct. 21, 2021, the containership ZIM Kingston had completed its transit from South Korea and was just offshore of Vancouver, Canada, waiting for anchorage and performing a controlled drift in 16-foot seas and 35-plus-knot winds when it began extreme, violent rolling of up to 36 degrees – 109 containers were lost overboard, and several smashed containers were strewn over the side. Nearly 36 hours later, a fire broke out in a damaged container full of flammable goods. The blaze burned for nearly five days.
An investigation by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) found that ZIM Kingston had experienced parametric rolling, which occurs when sea conditions converge with vessel-specific factors, causing the sudden onset of large, violent rolls from side to side.
The investigation identified two major safety concerns: The TSB said there needs to be better company and industry-wide guidance for managing the risk of parametric rolling. Furthermore, the incident “demonstrated some of the challenges involved in responding to a marine emergency in Canadian waters,” the TSB said in its report. “It also raised questions about the availability and capability of Canadian resources to do so.”
The the 853-foot, 40,030 gross-ton ZIM Kingston departed Busan, South Korea, on Oct. 6, 2021, bound for Vancouver with a load of 1,965 containers; 273 were loaded above deck. Four 40-foot containers and one 20-foot container contained sulfur-like compounds and were considered dangerous goods. The containership’s scheduled arrival was adjusted several times while underway due to berthing space availability, the report said. Despite slowing to minimum speed, ZIM Kingston arrived approximately three days ahead of schedule.
The ship approached La Perouse Bank outside of the Prince Rupert and Victoria Traffic Service zone around 0300 on Oct. 21. The forecast called for 35- to 42-knot winds from the southeast with a swell height of about 16 feet. “The master had been informed that there were no anchorages available, so he contacted Marine Communication and Traffic Services (MCTS) in Prince Rupert and stated that the vessel would be drifting at La Perouse Bank,” the TSB report said.
The master positioned ZIM Kingston’s bow southwesterly into the waves, stopped the main engine and allowed the vessel to drift northward for four hours at a speed of about 3 knots. Rolling did not exceed 10 degrees. The master then used the engine to return the vessel to its original position. ZIM Kingston repeated its drifting pattern twice between 0300 and 1800.
Around 2229, ZIM Kingston “rolled heavily to both port and starboard approximately four times, with the maximum roll being 36° … for about one-and-a-half minutes,” the TSB report read. “Crew on the bridge could see that containers had been lost. The master notified MCTS Prince Rupert that containers were in the water, and the Canadian Coast Guard issued a navigational warning.”
ZIM Kingston proceeded to the Constance Bank anchorage on Oct. 22 at 0018, where the crew discovered that more bays had lost containers. Crew found that several containers with dangerous goods — potassium amyl xanthate, a sulfur-like substance — had sustained damage, according to the report.
On Oct. 23, the master noticed smoke coming from the forward deck around 1046, as ZIM Kingston lay at anchor. Crew reported a fire in a collapsed container with dangerous goods. By 1056, crew had mustered to fight the blaze as the master consulted the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code to determine a method to fight a potassium amyl xanthate fire, the TSB report said.
ZIM Kingston’s second officer requested assistance to fight the fire around 1230. Several vessels, including two Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Ships, Cape Calvert and Captain Goddard, arrived on scene. “An emergency zone was established around the vessel, and all other vessels were cleared from Constance Bank,” the report said.
“At around 1322, the master notified the CCG that the intensity of the fire was increasing,” and had spread to six containers, including an inner row of containers that the crew could not access. “At 1658, the CCG recommended that the crew abandon ship because of the toxic smoke.” (The Canadian government wondered if the fire posed a risk to residents, but concerns were ultimately dismissed.) Resolve Marine, an emergency response company contracted by ZIM Kingston, recommended the containership retain “a small volunteer crew to keep the vessel operating and maintain the response to the fire,” the report read.
At 1706, Cape Calvert evacuated 10 crewmembers, then another six at 1834. The master and ship’s officers remained on board to continue fighting the blaze. Resolve Marine contracted two privately owned, foreign-flagged offshore-supply vessels, Maersk Trader and Maersk Tender, both of which happened to be berthed in Victoria at the time. Both vessels had firefighting class 1 systems. On Oct. 25, five Resolve Marine team members boarded ZIM Kingston to assess the fire, and seven of the 16 crewmembers who’d been evacuated returned to assist with firefighting efforts, the report said.
The fire was declared extinguished at 1545 on Oct. 28.
“Analysis of the pertinent vessel and environmental parameters shows that [ZIM Kingston] was at risk of developing parametric roll resonance, and that this risk was identifiable using some of the material generally available to the industry,” the TSB report concluded.
“However, the risk was not identifiable with the guidance on board the vessel at the time of the occurrence,” because the vessel owner did not have procedures to support ZIM Kingston’s bridge crew on managing the risk of parametric rolling, the TSB said, adding, “As a result, this risk was not being effectively monitored, and no mitigation measures were put in place as the vessel held offshore.”
The TSB report also said that broader industry policies on parametric rolling are inadequate, or nonexistent. “The STCW (Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping) curriculum for certification of officers on container vessels does not include training on parametric rolling,” the report said. The TSB also noted that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has not updated guidance on Parametric Rolling in 17 years. Current information has minimal operational guidance on parametric rolling, and offers no guidance with respect to “policies, procedures, training, tools, or services related to the management of risk associated with parametric rolling,” the report read.
Canada’s lack of preparedness for marine emergencies poses a risk to vessels, the environment, and public safety, the TSB report concluded. “While the Canadian Coast Guard has the capacity to evacuate crew members that are injured or at risk, there are systemic gaps in other aspects of responding to emergencies on vessels.”
The TSB said that fortuitous circumstances led to an effective, rapid response, given that the Maersk vessels happened to be nearby. U.S. legislation requires vessels such as ZIM Kingston to have preexisting contracts with U.S.-based emergency response companies. “Canada does not require pre-arranged plans for fire response or marine salvage,” the TSB said. In addition, the Canadian Coast Guard “does not directly participate in marine fire suppression activities as part of incident response, nor does it have fire suppression capabilities to respond to a vessel fire.
“Outside of ports and harbors, the options for responding to a shipboard fire are even more limited should an on-board fire response be unsuccessful in suppressing a fire,” the report concluded.