The pilot of a inland towboat fell asleep before the vessel deviated off course and struck an industrial cargo pier near Saint Rose, La., in late 2023, according to federal investigators.
The 2,000-hp John 3:16 was transiting upriver without any barges in tow when the contact occurred at about 0641 on Sept. 12, 2023, at Lower Mississippi River mile 118.6. There were no injuries or pollution, but damage to the pier and towboat approached $300,000.
According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report, the unidentified pilot didn’t remember anything after passing the towing vessel Okaloosa at about 0636. The bridge watch alarm woke him just prior to hitting the pier on the towboat’s starboard side.
“The probable cause of the contact of John 3:16 with an industrial cargo pier was the pilot falling asleep while navigating due to an accumulated sleep debt,” the report said. “Contributing to the pilot’s fatigue was cell phone use during off-watch time, which significantly limited the pilot’s opportunity for sleep.”
The incident highlighted ongoing industry challenges with fatigue, which reduces performance and reaction time while making it more difficult to stay awake, according to the NTSB. Acute fatigue also affects judgment and decision-making, sometimes reducing a person’s ability to recognize and detect their own reduced performance. In this case, the pilot likely got less than five hours of sleep in the 48 hours preceding the pier strike.
“This is less sleep than what the pilot typically received, and significantly less than the recommended 7–8 hours of sleep for each 24-hour period needed to avoid fatigue-related performance impacts,” the NTSB said in its report, noting that the pilot typically got five hours of sleep a night.
“Therefore, the pilot had accumulated an acute sleep debt in the two days before the casualty, which resulted in the pilot falling asleep while on watch, leading to the vessel’s contact with the pier.”
Marquette Transportation of Paducah, Ky., owned and operated the 21-year-old John 3:16 in its Gulf-Inland division. In a statement, the company said it appreciated the NTSB’s evaluation of the incident.
“Our top priorities are the safety and well-being of our mariners, the public and the environment,” said Kendall Chauvin, executive vice president for Marquette’s Gulf-Inland division. “We will continue to develop and implement initiatives to ensure our mariners receive adequate rest while off duty.
“We are thankful that the incident resulted in no injuries or environmental impacts, with minor property damage. We remain steadfast in our commitment to maintaining safe operations,” he continued.
The 71-foot vessel typically moved barges between fleeting areas on the Lower Mississippi with a six-person crew. The pilot and two deck hands came on watch at 0000 on Sept. 12, and AIS logs cited by investigators indicate the tow performed several transits between river miles 110 and 122. John 3:16’s crew dropped off a barge at mile 112 at 0528 and then got underway about 15 minutes later for the fleet at mile 143.
The tow made about 7 knots upriver against a light current. A deck hand delivered the pilot breakfast at about 0600 and thought the pilot appeared normal. Data from the vessel’s chartplotter shows the vessel turned to starboard at about 0638 and largely continued that path for the next three minutes until it contacted the pier.
“The pilot recalled, ‘hearing the dead man alarm, opening my eyes, and there was the dock,’” the report said.
John 3:16 sustained damage to its wheelhouse along the starboard side, primarily along the deck, railings, framing and windows, the report said, estimating repairs at about $90,000. Damage to the pier cost roughly $200,000 to fix.
The pilot had more than 16 years of experience in the towing industry and earned his credential in 2013. He admitted to the company’s port captain soon after the incident that he fell asleep. All crewmembers later tested negative for drugs and alcohol.
The NTSB reviewed the pilot’s work and rest history as part of the investigation. They learned the pilot was halfway through a 28-day rotation, during which time he worked the 0000-1200 watch, while the captain led the 1200-2400 watch. The pilot reported getting about five hours of sleep a night during his 28-day rotation, about the same as he got at home.
The pilot also admitted to investigators he was dealing with “personal stressors” in the days leading to the incident. In the day before the incident, for instance, the pilot received 11 phone calls totaling 77 minutes and sent 33 text messages during off-watch time on Sept. 11, nearly all of which went to the same number.
“The longest period during the pilot’s 12 hours of off-watch time without an outgoing text or connected phone call was 2 hours,” the report said, suggesting he slept no more than two hours in the day preceding the pier strike.
“The records also showed that during the casualty transit on Sept. 12, between 0548 and 0611, the pilot sent 10 text messages and made a 9-minute phone call,” the report continued. “However, there were no text messages or phone calls (incoming or outgoing) in the 30 minutes before the contact at 0641.”
The pilot’s cellphone use while on watch violated Marquette Transportation policies, which restricted such usage to “leisure time.” Marquette also had stop-work policies in place that required crewmembers experiencing fatigue to take measures to mitigate risk, such as waking the captain to take over the watch.
NTSB investigators, however, said “self-reporting” requirements like this one can be hindered by “industry or cultural factors that discourage individuals from acknowledging when they are too fatigued to continue operations.” They also noted that the pilot did not report feeling fatigued and thus did not stop work as company policies dictated.
“Instead,” the report went on, “he continued operations until he fell asleep.”