Not long after noon on a clear, sunny day, the bulk carrier Bunun Queen was sailing east in the Gulf of Mexico when it collided with the offshore supply vessel Thunder some 66 miles south of Port Fourchon, La.
The collision happened in open water at 1:14 p.m. on July 23, 2022. The impact opened a hole in Thunder’s port side, flooding a propulsion room and three other compartments. All 18 crewmembers aboard the OSV were uninjured, but damage exceeded $12 million.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators determined both ships had only one person on watch leading up to the collision — and that neither kept an effective lookout.
“The probable cause of the collision was the Bunun Queen officer’s distraction due to performing non-navigational tasks, and the Thunder officer’s distraction due to cell phone use, which kept both officers from keeping a proper lookout,” the NTSB said in its report.
“Contributing to the casualty,” the agency said, “was the Thunder officer on watch not following his company’s watchkeeping policies.”
Jackson Offshore Operations, based in Harvey, La., operated the 252-foot Thunder. The company had previously declined to comment on the incident, and it did not respond to an inquiry from Professional Mariner on the NTSB findings.
Attempts to reach the owner and operator of the Liberia-flagged bulker Bunun Queen were not successful.
Thunder got underway at about 7 a.m. on July 23 from an oil platform about 130 miles south of Port Fourchon. The ship’s master assumed watch at around noon to allow the second mate and a mate trainee to perform other tasks that included testing the fire pumps.
The 590-foot Bunun Queen left for New Orleans in ballast on July 22 after offloading its cargo in Houston. The second mate assumed navigational watch at 11:45 a.m. without a dedicated lookout on the bridge. That person was resting ahead of cargo hold cleaning duties scheduled for later that afternoon, the report said.
By 12:45 p.m., the two ships were both operating on autopilot and had closed to 7.7 miles of one another. Neither officer recognized the developing close quarters situation nor took any steps to prevent it from happening.
“Each vessel was present on the other’s automatic radar and plotting aid (APRA) display, both as a radar and AIS target,” the report said. “Neither radar had any automatic target tracking or alarm features enabled, and neither vessel was acquired by either person on watch.”
Around this time, the second mate aboard Bunun Queen was occupied printing electronic navigational charts. He later admitted to NTSB investigators that he neglected his lookout duties by focusing on the printing duties.
Thunder’s master, who was not identified in the report, spent chunks of time leading up to the collision using his personal cell phone. He made a personal call and dictated several text messages. Investigators said he violated his own standing orders around cell phone use and always having two people on the bridge.
At 1 p.m., the two ships were within 3.8 miles of one another. That distance rapidly closed over the next 14 minutes. Other crewmembers aboard the OSV noticed the ship bearing down on them less than a minute before impact. Thunder’s master took steps to minimize damage but could not prevent the collision.
“The bulbous bow of Bunun Queen, which was traveling at 14.4 knots, struck the port side of Thunder, which was traveling at nine knots,” the report said. “Upon arriving on the bridge, (the second mate) saw the master at the main console, and he went to the port side of the bridge where he saw the Bunun Queen’s port side passing down the port side of Thunder.
“He noted the impact caused Thunder to heel to starboard, and water rushed over the main deck from the starboard side. The stern was pushed to starboard, making the bow go to port,” the report continued.
The hull opening was above and below the waterline. The opening allowed water to flood several internal spaces, and the OSV developed a portside list. The engineer used the ship’s ballast pump to dewater the flooded engine compartment. He also worked to elevate the port side to minimize flooding.
Bunun Queen did not stick around after the collision, and its communications with Thunder were garbled immediately after impact. According to the NTSB, the vessel continued at full ahead for nine minutes before stopping the engine. The master’s explanation, according to the report, was that its crew was performing a damage assessment.
The crew boat Lady Tierney responded to the damaged OSV, which lost propulsion but maintained electrical power. Eleven of Thunder’s crewmembers embarked onto the good Samaritan vessel, while seven essential personnel stayed behind awaiting an assist tugboat that ultimately towed Thunder to Port Fourchon.
NTSB investigators said crews aboard both vessels failed to follow international regulations for maintaining a proper lookout.
“Both the second officer of Bunun Queen and the master of Thunder failed to fulfill a fundamental duty required by international law for a vessel underway: to maintain a proper lookout,” the report said. “Therefore, neither vessel’s bridge watch officer detected the approach of the other vessel.”
“Had either vessel had an additional person on the bridge,” the report concluded, “it is likely that at least one vessel’s crew would have sighted the other vessel.”